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Abstract 
Identifying community interests in processes of planning and regeneration is less than 
straightforward. By their very nature programmes encourage the development of 
particular projects, typically relying on experience from past initiatives to inform current 
practice. One of the difficulties for partners is juggling the need to comply with 
administrative demands while engaging in a meaningful way with their community. This 
paper uses empirical evidence to examine power relations within structures of 
governance. It argues that current processes are unable to identify real community 
interests and consequently create space that favour elite interests; all of which restrain 
the impact of governance. 
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Community regeneration: an elite or a ‘real’ community space? 
Introduction 
Current literature reveals how processes of governance are central to contemporary 
planning practice, with participatory programmes assuming a central position (see for 
example, Miraftab, and McConnell, 2008; Harwood and Zapata, 2006; and Raco et al. 
2006).  Issues of community and state power have emerged to become heavily debated 
subjects within this era of governance. As the impact of systems of governance being 
felt at a global level (OECD, 2001), the policy landscape has changed dramatically. 
Governance marks the erosion of traditional boundaries, relying on new partners 
including the community, public and private sector and based on devolved power 
(Tendler, 1997; Murdoch and Abram, 1998; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998; Pierre, 2000; 
Jessop, 2002). In these new partnership arrangements the state does not merely hand 
power over to the community, but it assumes an altered position in the processes of 
governance so that ‘power and interest are not simply rendered meaningless but are 
redefined and relocated’ (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003:5). The changed role for 
government in this approach offers a clue as to where significant analysis might be 
conducted. Where and how does the central state relocate its power and interest? 
What is the impact for regeneration actors?  
 
The legitimacy of power conferred on the new ‘partners’ from the private and civic 
realm is the subject of an emerging debate within the literature (see for instance 
Cashore, 2002; Connelly and Richardson, 2004; Shortall, 2005; Goodwin, 2006 and 
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Derkzen and Bock, 2009). Less attention has been focused on the implications of 
systems of governance for communities. It is argued that further knowledge of these 
relations would contribute to our understanding of the structures and processes of 
governance (Edwards et al. 2001; Storey 1999; Shortall 2004; Hayward et al., 2004; 
Pearce et al. 2005). 
 
This paper seeks to examine community involvement in governance by using a project 
funded under UK government’s Single Regeneration Budget. The paper begins by 
outlining the context for the emergence of regeneration partnerships. The concept of 
power is examined before moving on to describe the case study in some detail including 
an overview of the Single Regeneration Budget, background to the area in which the 
project was developed and analysis of the governance structures that emerged. Finally 
the conclusions consider the implications for structures of governance, with particular 
focus on the relationship between the state and other partners. 
 
Decentralisation and regionalisation 
The decentralisation of responsibilities for policy making and delivery has resulted in 
new political arrangements comprising multi-level and meta-governance (Jessop, 2005; 
Peters and Pierre, 2001). It signifies a different way of achieving things, a movement 
from (stable) institutional approaches towards a (fluid) networked form of policymaking 
(Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). 
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Decentralisation and the reformation of political structures bring the concept of 
participation centre stage. It enables citizens to more actively participate in structures 
of ‘governance’, that is, an institutional framework broader than government, based on 
the idea of partnership, devolving power, and including the community, public and 
private sector (Jessop, 1990; Tendler, 1997; Pearce et al. 2005). A proliferation of 
partnerships between public and civil society sectors stemming from these new 
governance practices has been evident across the globe (Rhodes, 1997; Lowndes and 
Skelcher et al., 1996; Goodwin, 1998; Stoker, 1998; Jones and Little, 2000; Edwards et 
al, 2001; Pierre, 2000; Gaventa, 2004; and World Bank, 2004).  
 
The result of the trend in regional policy to decentralize is far reaching, leading to many 
challenges. It has necessitated a paradigm shift from a top-down approach to one which 
relies on a bottom-up, integrative approach, involving many different partners: the State 
no longer assumes sole responsibility for governing. Crucially though ‘government in 
most states retain control over the key policy levers’ (Ayres and Pearce, 2008:540). This 
sea change to the implementation of policy relies on local assets and knowledge and has 
also placed pressure on tradition hierarchical administrative structures (OECD, 2005). It 
calls for a collective/negotiated approach which revolves around power relations as 
actors seek to influence the actions of others in order to pursue a particular agenda. 
This has not been without criticism and the literature would suggest that the capacity 
for communities to exercise genuine power is limited (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Hickey 
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and Mohan, 2004), asymmetric power relations prevail (Skelcher et al., 1996; Campbell 
and Marshall, 2000; Muir, 2004 and Somerville, 2005). 
 
Understanding power relations 
Power is central to our understanding of social relations within society and as a result it 
has attracted much attention within the literature. But the notion of power is not 
unproblematic. It is notoriously intangible and so it is hard to identify and measure. In 
the traditional sense, common usage of power refers to capacity to bring about change. 
Locke (1979) considers power as relational, being the capacity to make or receive any 
change. To which Lukes (2005) adds that it is also about being able to resist change.  
 
While Lukes’ himself has been critical of his own work (Lukes, 2005; 2006) many 
commentators have also identified shortcomings of his work (see for instance Hayward, 
2000; Hindess 2006 and Shapiro, 2006). It is not intended to enter these debates here. 
Instead, this paper uses Lukes’ concept of power, particularly the hidden third 
dimension, to understand the practice of regeneration within an empirical study. 
 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) claim that power has a private face that is evident in covert 
exclusion of the interests of particular groups. It is exercised through control or 
manipulation of the agenda, so that the very scope of decision-making is confined to 
particular issues. By providing a context for the manipulation of decision-making, the 
second face of power recognises the role of politics in social processes. Lukes (2005) 
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claims that by limiting analysis to observable behaviour, whether overt or covert, the 
two-dimensional model does not go far enough. Power, he argues, relies on the capacity 
and the legitimacy to call on the obedience of others; it is about being able to influence 
the thoughts and desires of the victims without their being aware of its effects and so 
their real interests are suppressed. So although individuals may have the capacity to 
exercise power; they may choose not to do so (Barnes, 1988; Scott, 2001; and Lukes, 
2005).  
 
‘Relations of power of the second and third dimension…can operate by generating gaps 
between preferences, wants, and real interests’ (Ron, 2008:273). In other words 
people’s very wants are a product of a flawed system. Consequently we need to ‘search 
behind appearances for the hidden, least visible forms of power’ (Lukes 2005:86). The 
dynamic process of uncovering real interests represents a complex relation between the 
power elite and the masses. This suggests that we need to consider individual relations 
and to critically examine the way in which actors are involved and situated in processes 
of governance. However the nature of the micro-relations that emerge among these 
new partners has to date only been given some recognition (Murtagh, 2001; Barnes et 
al., 2003; Scott, 2004; author, 2006, 2007; Derkzen et al. 2008) but has not yet been 
fully examined. 
 
This understanding of power is based on community studies of power that emerged as a 
critique of American democracy in the 1950s (see for example Hunter 1953) and 
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premised on the ideal of a community of autonomous persons. Individuals are discursive 
beings who endow social life with meaning and have the capacity to interpret and 
construct their social world and setting, rather than merely responding in a simplistic 
and automatic way to stimuli (Mead 1934; Cooley 1942; Blumer 1969). But these 
individuals will never be autonomous in the purest of senses. Power is connected to 
social structures (Giddens, 1984; Lukes, 2005). Traditions and discourses affect actors 
beliefs and actions, consequently agency is situated (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006). Power 
therefore relates to the capacity of agents to ‘make a difference’ and it is a structural 
property of society or the social community (Giddens, 1984:14).  
 
Decentralisation in England 
The Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) illustrates the complexity of the governance 
model. As part of the devolution process, English Government Offices and the Regional 
Development Agencies were given an enhanced role in delivering European and central 
government policies. Specifically in 1999 following their launch, Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) inherited a number of funding programmes such as Rural Priority 
Areas1 and the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB), incorporating the Rural Challenge 
Fund2. Taken together these programmes had in turn been governed by a variety of 
                                                 
1 Formerly known as Rural Development Areas and managed by the Rural Development 
Commission, this operated using a partnership representing different stakeholders and providing 
funding for projects according to a strategic action plan and as such represented an integrated 
approach to rural development. 
2 The RPA and SRB programmes were later terminated and funding streamlined to became a 
‘Single Pot’ (DETR, 2002:12). 
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central government agencies. Government Offices oversee the work of the RDAs, and in 
turn all GOs were managed by a central government department. 
 
In the early days, many of the new RDAs were coming to terms with internal 
management issues and associated with the amalgamation of separate organisations. 
Simultaneously they were endeavouring to fulfil statutory requirements including 
administering funding programmes and publishing a Regional Economic Development 
Strategy (Regional Development Agencies Act 1998, 4.2). Decentralisation continues and 
in 2005 the Countryside Agency's rural economic and social regeneration work was 
transferred to the RDAs. Most recently the RDAs assumed responsibility for 
implementing this aspect of the new English Rural Development Programme (DEFRA, 
2007).  
 
The case study 
The case study informing this paper was a Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) project, the 
Community Initiative. Twenty-five semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
professional practitioners and community representatives. A daily diary or research 
journal that focused on the ‘behaviouristic’ (Fielding, 1993:162) was maintained to 
record events at the lowest level of interference. This data was complemented by field 
notes, meeting papers, funding and policy papers and newspapers. Finally discussion 
occurred in informal ad hoc situations including prior to and following events.  
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The overall research was conducted within an ethnographic framework that places 
emphasis on Weber’s concept of verstehen; that is the subjective meaning that humans 
attach to their actions and interactions within specific social contexts (Elwell, 1996). 
Overt participant observation was used as the author was employed in a housing 
association, House, during the development of the project. This paper focuses on the 
early stages of the project development, from preliminary community planning to the 
establishment of structures to effectively implement objectives. The research placed 
emphasis on the process (see Author, 2008 for a fuller discussion of emergent 
methodological and process issues). This approach was vital in order to consider the 
‘latent conflict...between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests 
of those they exclude’ (Lukes, 2005:28). Steps were taken to address issues of 
confidentiality through the use of pseudonyms (Van den Hoonaard, 2002). 
 
It is important to state from the outset that this research assesses the practice of 
governance; it does not evaluate the Community Initiative in the conventional way. 
Judged by the SRB programme outcomes and outputs, the project was very successful: 
it levered in funding worth just over £2m over a 3 year period. Indeed it follows the 
pattern of many other projects that are deemed to be successful by funding agencies. It 
successfully undertook community consultation, ascertaining the views of local 
residents and subsequently established a project structure to implement the project 
plan.  
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The Single Regeneration Budget 
The Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) was a regeneration programme operational in England 
from 1994 to 2002. The central government body managing it, the then Department of 
Environment, Transport and the Regions3 (DETR), set broad parameters within which individual 
projects would operate by issuing national guidance for the SRB. This focused on delivery plans; 
project appraisal and approval; financial guidance; and monitoring and periodic review but was 
‘not intended to be a desk instruction for Partnerships and RDAs (Regional Development 
Agencies’ DETR, 1999a:1). The programme emphasised the central role of local communities in 
regenerating their area with the aim ‘to encourage local communities to develop local 
regeneration initiatives to improve the quality of life in their area’ (DETR, 1997:3). Partnership, 
competition and hands-off management were also seen to be embedded in the SRB scheme 
(Rhodes et al., 2002). Locally based groups submitted proposals to their RDA. Successful 
projects were approved by a combination of regional and central government while the detailed 
procedures and day-to-day management arrangements were developed between the RDA and 
the SRB partnership, all within the confines of central government requirements. This 
decentralised approach continues to be used and is evident in schemes such as the European 
rural development programme (CEC, 2005) and the English framework for regeneration 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008). 
 
The Community Initiative 
                                                 
3 Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR) took over regeneration 
funding in 2000, this responsibility was then transferred to DTI following the June 2001 election 
(www.dti.gov.uk). Most recently the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform has responsibility for RDAs. 
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The case study project, the Community Initiative is focused on two adjacent settlements 
in England, a village and a small town, with a combined population of approximately 
20,000 and both having reasonable proximity to London. The village comprises an older 
style centre along with a newer London overspill settlement. The older part of the 
village consists of predominantly Victorian housing with facilities including a church, 
pub, barbershop and newsagents. Numerous community activities revolve round its 
Community Centre (built during the 1960s) and the drama theatre located in the upper 
school. Most residents travel to the adjoining market town for their weekly provisions 
and the town acts as an important employment, shopping and cultural centre for many 
more people from the rural hinterland. It has a variety of shops in the centre and many 
other facilities round about, including a leisure centre, restaurants, pubs and churches.  
 
Fundamentally the regeneration partnership, the Community Initiative, was formed 
because at the time of conducting the research, although the village and the town 
contained 3% of the county’s population, 20% of the poorest and most deprived wards 
in the county were found in this area. Furthermore it was affected by a general long-
term lack of investment, lack of modern healthcare facilities and inadequate sewerage 
and drainage systems. A fatal fire on a council estate marked a watershed. Three 
different residents’ groups placed pressure on the council to invest in their community. 
The District Council responded positively and two major changes ensued. One was the 
allocation of £35,000 per council house for refurbishment and fireproofing, totalling 
£5m over five years (Council Officer, 25.02.02). The other was the devotion of Council 
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staff to the development of an SRB project to address deprivation within the community 
and to ‘kickstart a larger programme of regeneration’ (Council Officer, 25.11.99). This 
paper focuses on that project.  
 
Configuring the Community Project 
Partnership, a key concept in the governance, was at the heart of the Community 
Initiative. A fairly complicated structure emerged for this particular scheme with 
approximately 50 partners drawn from public, private and voluntary sectors including 
residents groups, local authorities, housing associations, health agencies and business 
groups, figure one below provides an overview. Partners were committed to realising 
the project objectives of ‘social and economic capacity building’, achieving 
‘improvements for the quality of life of the residents’ and ‘enabling all residents to 
participate fully in society’ (SRB final bid).  
 
Insert figure one 
 
The Board 
A working group that was instrumental in writing the SRB application was subsumed 
into the Board with additional members being co-opted to provide representation from 
parish, town, district and county councils and from the three different strands (see later 
for strand functions). There were no elections as individuals were co-opted by the 
council officers. Aside from the parish and town council representatives there was no 
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individual on the Board whose membership was based on the fact that they lived in the 
area; they were all associated with a particular organization, agency or group. 
 
The Forum 
The Forum was initially used to consult with individuals from the community over the 
proposed content of the bid and so provided a mechanism that allowed members of the 
public to participate. In general about forty people attended these meetings. The 
meeting of 27.09.01 was themed ‘Funding opportunities for voluntary organizations and 
community groups’ (Forum minutes, 27.09.01) and its format illustrates a typical Forum 
meeting. It included informal presentations and information sessions from local and 
regional voluntary organizations. The meeting received an update of the ongoing work 
of the SRB project and oversaw the election of two representatives from the voluntary 
sector to the Board. It began with tea and coffee at 5.30pm, with the formal business 
starting at 6pm. Following an open question and answer session the meeting ended just 
after 7pm.  
 
The Strands 
Three Strands were created encompassing the following themes: neighbourhood and 
community; health; and local economy and training. They were established to facilitate 
input from professionals and users to the Community Initiative. Their purpose is 
reflected in the invitation to the first community and neighbourhood strand meeting. 
Voluntary and community sector organizations were asked to participate to ‘identify 
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high priority needs’ for their group and ‘to ensure all relevant voluntary and community 
organizations are represented within the bid’ (28.03.00).  
 
 
Regeneration rules: a help or a hindrance? 
The local authority faced a dilemma in dealing with three month period allowed within 
the programme between the acceptance of expression of interest and the submission of 
the final bid. It considered that this was insufficient time to engage with the number 
and variety of stakeholder interests, while also engaging in a meaningful way with the 
local community (Council Officer, 20.03.00). A working group was established by council 
officers and comprised of two council officers along with representatives from a local 
business forum, a rural development agency, a health organisation and a housing 
association (the author). The ‘lack of knowledge and experience of effective multi-
partner delivery schemes’ (council officer note to strand co-ordinators 14.07.00) 
instilled a certain degree of fear among local authority officers: 
 
‘[council officers] were pretty honest in admitting that the bureaucracy of this 
programme is crippling (26.09.00). Later the council officers questioned how the 
Community Initiative processes compared to other SRB bids, to get the response ‘very 
rigorous to the point where we could be accused of being too cautious’ from another 
member of the Board’ (research journal, 14.12.00). 
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Overall the technical skills required by of the financially accountable body (the council) 
were not insubstantial; they amounted to huge administrative obligations. Duties 
included receipt of and use of the final grant payment; establishing effective project 
appraisal and financial management systems; drawing up ongoing evaluation plans; 
establishing a project for post scheme evaluation; submission of quarterly reports and 
annual audited reports to the RDA (DETR, 1999a and b). Partnerships were required to 
demonstrate relationships with other schemes such as regional and national strategies, 
showing how the ‘SRB contribution will enhance, reinforce and add value to other 
initiatives and public spending programmes’ (1999b: para 1.5.1). Many of the 
obligations were depicted using technical phrases such as ‘deed of novation’ (1999a 
Annex 1D) ‘key indicators of performance’, ‘milestones’ ‘quantifiable outputs’, and ‘exit 
strategy’ (1999a:para5.1), so that ‘[the RDA] recognises that there is a significant 
learning curve for everyone involved in this new SRB project’ (Board minutes, 14.12.00). 
This created substantial challenges not least of which was the act of juggling 
bureaucracy with operational responsibilities. 
 
‘We [SRB Board] had a difficult dilemma over the process being pulled from a number of 
directions: being accountable, having systems in place whilst also getting on with the 
task in hand’ (30.11.00). 
 
As the act of regeneration is technical rather than political (Taylor, 2003), we have 
evidence of a process where the agents of the elite, i.e. those creating regeneration 
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programmes, devise a structure that maintains the power of the ruling elite, i.e. the 
policy makers and the central state (Mills, 1956). Meanwhile the parameters of policy 
are established elsewhere (Taylor, 2003, Jones, 2003), consequently the rules do not 
necessarily assist the process. 
 
(Re)Creating (elite) structures. 
Guidance material did not compel partnerships to be led by local councils. Their 
predominant role was promoted ‘the RDA can only enter into a funding agreement with 
a legal entity capable of meeting the liabilities that flow from the conditions of grant’ 
(DETR, 1999a: para 8.1) supporting the notion that the rules of engagement in 
partnerships rest firmly with the elite (Bochel, 2006).  
 
The supremacy of the public sector, and the power wielded by it, was further evidenced 
by the way in which capacity building was addressed. The SRB guidance provides a 
section on ‘Community Capacity Building’ (DETR, 1999b: para: 1.4.7), there is no similar 
section for other partners such as those from the public sector. And in case there is any 
doubt on this, the meaning of capacity building is spelled out as ‘activities to increase 
the capacity of local communities to contribute to regeneration and the strengthening 
of the social fabric, for example through training of staff and volunteers in community 
groups, through the strengthening of networks, forums or representative structures’ 
(DETR. 1999a: Appendix one, output 8F). It is notable that this contrasts with 
international development programmes where funding is provided to local government 
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in Chile, Honduras, Bolivia and Zambia specifically to build their capacity to effectively 
develop local-level initiatives (Babajanian, 2005). By assuming that capacity building is 
only required by certain partners in the SRB programme, even though the literature 
suggests otherwise (see for instance Mannion, 1996, Taylor 2000 and Scott, 2004), the 
evolving structures implicitly underpin the superiority of public sector approaches. 
There is little encouragement of change to their institutional practices through 
involvement in the programme. This inherent assumption of organisational superiority is 
a symptom of the privileged ruling stratum; it is part of the ideology of the elite (Mills, 
1956).  
 
Further the officers effectively established a blueprint that duplicated the council 
culture within the partnership. Officers claimed that they could not ‘simply put the 
project in the control of another organisation’ (Council Officer, 23.08.00). In fact they 
proposed recruiting a secondee from their organisation to the post of the project 
manager. Reminiscent of Katz’s claim that policy elites successfully define ideal types of 
organisational structures (1975), the Forum was told that ‘the process [for managing the 
money] is now being finalised with [the] District Council’ (07.03.01). The Council paper 
‘Proposed Administration and Delivery Structure’ (03.08.00) clarifies its central role 
asserting that: 
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‘ultimate decision making powers lie with [the] District Council as they are the 
financially accountable body, but they will be advised by the Management Board, who 
will in turn be informed by the three Strands and the Consultation Forum’(24.08.00).  
 
Somerville considers that the moulding of citizens in their own image or 
‘responsibilisation’ reinforces and reproduces elite power (2005:125). Such ‘mimetic 
isomorphism’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:150) is yet another example of Lukes’ third 
dimension of power (2005). Participants in programmes are not necessarily aware of 
this subtle form of manipulation, and even if they are, their ability to affect change is 
questionable.  
 
Council officers in the Community Project had an inflexible view of power relations. 
Implicitly they understood power in the Weberian tradition as a zero sum game, if they 
handed power over to community representatives; they believed their own control 
would be eroded. They did not conceive of power as something that could be tapped 
into and mobilised by the collective whole for the greater good (Parsons, 1960; Mann, 
1960).  
 
Achieving participation and managing expectations  
Given the time constraints associated with the bidding schedule, the working group 
took a pragmatic decision to use existing networks and connections to kickstart the 
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consultation process on the basis that wider and deeper participation would follow. The 
forum chairman stated that  
 
‘the partnership must not be exclusive and although 30 organizations have been invited 
to the meeting, there will be other important organizations who will hopefully wish to 
become involved and that one of the purposes of the discussion groups would be to 
identify other contributing partners’ (Forum minutes 22.03.00). Meanwhile council 
officers urged agencies that   
 
‘If you can identify any group that you feel should be invited please feel free to copy this 
letter to them’ (28.03.00). But it remained difficult to attract new individuals to the 
process:  
 
‘Despite a free buffet, not much interest was shown, with few new faces at the meeting’ 
(research journal, 11.04.00). 
 
The fledgling partnership faced the ‘revolving door syndrome’ (Taylor, 2000:1020) 
where usual suspects, rather than disenfranchised groups, are primarily involved.  
 
Even those who were involved more fully were dubious about their capacity to exert 
influence. They believed that ultimately the Council was in control of the key decisions 
and so they were unable to influence the project anyway. 
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‘But we’re not really involved in this project. It’s one of your schemes isn’t it? I mean, 
we’re not making decisions about how the money is spent are we?’ (local resident, 
20.03.00) 
 
There was a feeling of ‘remoteness’ from the project and a tenant liaison officer stated 
that ‘it is not clear how it fits with the other activities, it has been pigeonholed. Stronger 
links with the refurbishment scheme [i.e. the revamping of the council estate] would be 
useful’ (Council Officer 25.02.02). 
 
While the Forum appeared to advance wide participation closer scrutiny reveals its 
controlled and limited nature and indeed of the overall project. To paraphrase Mills 
(1956), even though the residents of the area were living in a time of big decisions; they 
were not making any. For example many of the attendees to the Forum consultation 
meetings expressed concern over the threatened closure of the local hospital. They 
clearly believed that this was the appropriate vehicle to raise the matter and did so 
during the question and answer slot. They failed to understand that Forum 
consultations were part of a distinct participatory process bounded by the SRB rules. 
The council officer attempted to explain: 
 
 22 
‘I know the threatened hospital closure is very important to everyone here.  But I’m 
afraid we can’t provide funding for that. What we can do is support the wide range of 
projects that are outlined in the bid document’ (22.03.00). 
 
Participation was an output of the regeneration programme, ‘slotting’ into pre-
determined and externally defined aims (Oakley, 1991; Jones, 2003), rather than a 
process that also ascertained views and shaped the bid. If we consider power ‘in terms 
of agents’ abilities to bring about significant effects, specifically by furthering their own 
interests and/or affecting the interests of others, whether positively or negatively’ 
(Lukes, 2005:65), then these actors were not empowered. The content of the meeting 
was highly prescribed; there was little room to veer away from SRB activities. 
 
Repeated studies of community involvement have shown how communities have 
generally remained on the margins of power in partnership arrangements (Taylor, 2007; 
Hastings, 1996; Bochel, 2006; Gilchrist, 2006). While accepting the naivety of the 
assumption of a single community interest (Edwards, 1997; Muir and Rhodes, 2008); 
failing to give the wider ‘community’ an opportunity to take up positions of influence 
lessens the status of the partnership. A further danger with this approach according to 
Wood et al. (2001 cited in Hayward et al. 2004) is that views can be represented quite 
differently when filtered through representatives compared to when they are expressed 
directly. Participation for the council officers was clearly a restricted affair and was not 
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something that was widely available for all actions. And so public accountability is 
sharpened rather than public participation enhanced (Newman, 2001). 
 
Covert power 
There was evidence of the exercise of covert power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, Lukes, 
2005). The local authority officer described the purpose of the consultation meeting: 
 
‘[T]he question we are discussing tonight relates to the contents of the SRB application 
that is to be submitted. This will not be an easy process but we can work together to 
identify priorities and to put in a shared bid’ (14.10.99). 
  
In a genuine consultation, the question would have been phrased differently. It might 
have asked ‘Do people wish the Council to put resources into the SRB?’ Effectively the 
question of whether or not an application would be made was not up for discussion – 
the scenario was presented as an 'opportunity not to be missed' (research journal, 
12.10.99). People were therefore given the opportunity to participate in a limited 
exercise, that of developing a bid to the SRB and the restrictions that this entailed. 
Hence a barrier was immediately created preventing people who did not agree with this 
use of local authority resources from entering the debate. Powerful individuals (namely 
the working group) limited the scope of debate to issues that were comparatively 
harmless to their interests.  
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The consultation with the community therefore legitimated a previously made decision 
made by the local authority to make a submission to the SRB programme. The 
discussion was limited to the form of the bid rather than concentrating on whether or 
not a bid should be made in the first place. In confining decision-making to particular 
issues, covert power was exercised (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962); real interests were not 
identified or discussed. As a result a sympathetic and unproblematic public 
representation that was viewed as serving the general interest followed and was met 
with little opposition. In actual fact power was exerted within the restricted area of the 
working group where access was limited to social and political elites (Woods, 1998a and 
1998b). These backstage spaces are located away from the formal decision making 
processes, intervention from opponents or the constraints of regulation. The wider 
forum was powerless as it approved a decision made by certain individuals rather than 
the community. Hidden power was evident as those outside control were not only 
omitted from the political process but they were denied entry (Lukes, 2005). Although 
they were able to become involved in the forum and strand meetings, they were not 
invited to join the working group and thereby to participate in the restricted area. 
 
Individual positions of power 
As the Community Initiative progressed and in the course of discussions with council 
officers, it became clear that they viewed the author as a safe choice for key positions 
within the project structure. She was one of two co-ordinators of the Community and 
Neighbourhood Strand that were hand-picked by the Local Authority Officers involved 
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in the project. The Officers were looking for individuals with whom they could work as 
well as people with useful skills and contacts: 
 
‘My background is in council led business programmes. Engaging with the community 
was quite novel for me and I went through a steep learning curve. I was glad to have 
[the author] there to share consultation techniques’ (Council Officer, 25.02.02). 
 
Originally the author resisted the position of Strand co-ordinator, but eventually agreed 
to do it in the short term: 
 
 ‘[Council Officer] would like me to continue with co-ordinating community/social 
strand (alongside [the rural regeneration agency]). I am happy to do this...I also 
suggested to [Council Officer] that the [Community Initiative] management group 
should have a ‘voluntary representative’ as it is purely made up of paid staff. Interesting 
to hear his comments, he does not want a lot of controversy and he considers that this 
might make things “tricky”’ (research journal, 23.08.00). 
 
Similarly individuals for the working group were handpicked on the basis of a number of 
factors, as articulated by council officers to the author: 
 
‘Knowledge, guidance and the ability to signpost to other agencies was an invaluable 
contribution from [your project]. This went hand-in-hand with you as an individual. If a 
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different person had been running the project, we might not have had this link’ (Council 
Officer, 24.02.02). 
 
 ‘We had some limited experience of consultation and public engagement. It was useful 
to have your input. Your contribution to the debate around neighbourhood renewal was 
helpful as well as your role in pushing and developing this’ (Council Officer, 25.02.02).  
 
Dahl (1961:226) outlines various sources of power in social relations including access to 
money, information, social standing, charisma and legitimacy. The author’s position was 
valued in part due to her position; specifically this was the ‘prestige’ (Mills, 1956:82) of 
her employer’s position in the regeneration sector and the fact that House was ‘well 
connected’ as a result of links with powerful funding and policy bodies (Council Officer, 
25.02.02). But it also arose from the knowledge and contacts that the author possessed 
and the fact that the officers knew that they could work with her personally. Power was 
‘distributed by the various enduring structural relationships in society and exercised by 
individuals and groups based on their location in a given structure’ (Isaac, 1987:28). 
 
Creating an elite space? 
Complex forms of power are being used to affect change via governance initiatives. 
Whereas policy ideals of maximum participation and equal power relations prevail, it 
may be the case that structures employed enable a certain type of participation 
depending on the degree of ‘insiderness’ and relating to degrees of access and influence 
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(Maloney et al., 1994:26). To paraphrase Lukes (2005), the powerful [public sector] 
agents derive their capacity and legitimacy from structures to call on the obedience of 
less powerful [community and voluntary sector] agents.  
 
Public participation is a limited activity; it constrains particular voices. It is also restricted 
by the individuals who choose to get involved and so it is limited in terms of what it is 
able to achieve. Agents are in turn constrained by the structure of the funding 
framework so that while they are able to freely express their ideas and beliefs, to 
remain involved and to participate they must abide by the complex rules of the game; 
they must operate within pre-determined boundaries. This is not a ‘popular space’ that 
emerges from within and is defined by the community; it is an ‘invited space’ of 
governance in that it is an arena created and defined by government and is one into 
which communities are invited by the state (Cornwall, 2004). 
 
Further, and crucially, the practice of regeneration exhibits many of the symptoms of an 
elite activity (Mills, 1956). It is a technical rather than a political process. It is determined 
and controlled by a clique of policy makers and their corresponding agents resulting in a 
process that does not necessarily correlate to the needs, skills or indeed the culture of 
the wider of the community that it purports to represent. It is important to assert that 
this does not necessarily appear as a failure; indeed the Community Initiative was very 
positive for the communities involved. However those outside the elite circle were 
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confined to the margins and so their particular agendas were sidelined as administrative 
concerns or projects that were deemed feasible by the regulations took precedence. 
 
On the surface this would seem to correlate to Lukes’ understanding of power 
(2005:65). It relates to agents’ (primarily the local authority, but also the elite working 
group) bringing about considerable effects by both furthering their own interests while 
in this case also affecting the interests of others (the individuals and groups that got 
involved in the [SRB Project]). It remains unclear the extent (positively or negatively) to 
which the real interests of others were affected. What is crucial to this research is the 
fact that an elite group retained control of the parameters of governance, affecting the 
real interests of the masses. And so following from Ron (2008), specific regeneration 
schemes can only represent some interests, while others’ are not identified; the real 
interests of the masses are ignored or marginalised. Community planning and ultimately 
regeneration schemes are in danger of becoming inert and impotent (Williams, 2004) 
and ultimately potential achievements curtailed. This is critical given the increasing 
emphasis on this type of approach in a policy environment seeped in governance.  
 
Final comments 
On the one hand in this age of public accountability and scarcity of resources, it might 
be completely unrealistic and idealistic to consider that a community can have 
responsibility for entirely setting its own agenda, free from constraints, to determine 
endlessly the types of activities in which it can engage. Indeed sceptics might well 
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exclaim, so what, regeneration works and involves representation from ‘the 
community’. This is true and it has many positive attributes. On the other hand its 
limitations must be acknowledged if persistent inequalities and marginalisation are to 
be addressed. If an elite group operate within an invited space and purport to represent 
broader interests it is entirely misleading to set up these structures and systems of 
governance and claim that they are acting wholly in the real interests of the community. 
While positive benefits to a community typically emerge, it is vital that the central role 
of the state in shaping the outcomes is recognised. As such the very nature of 
participation does not necessarily allow for real interests to be identified. Current 
models are in danger of over-stating their potential. Perhaps more importantly an elite 
regeneration community is being situated within a space that has more traditionally 
been inhabited by dissension. Subsequently the oppositional space is at risk of being 
marginalised. 
 
This paper set out to evaluate arrangements for processes of governance with particular 
reference to power. In keeping with existing literature it shows how the state agenda is 
firmly etched in new governance spaces (Swyngedouw, 2005; Taylor, 2007). This is 
manifest through elite groups of individuals who use their power to pursue specific 
agendas. The complex web of governance needs to create space for bottom-up 
development to avoid dominance of the interests of the state and of elite community 
interests. If there is to be any possibility of meaningful engagement with a community 
and of addressing issues of inequality, community participation must be perceived not 
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as a one-off proposition, instead it should be viewed as an ongoing process. Clearly the 
usual requirements of time and resources are necessary. But more than this 
policymakers need to pay heed to the limitations of current governance structures and 
seek ways of engaging with communities whose interests may fall outside of invited 
spaces. It may be that mainstream policy instruments assume this responsibility, but this 
has to be recognised. If not, Ron’s claim that ‘a community understands its own 
problems through frameworks that are in fact inadequate to address its own goals’ is in 
danger of being realised (2008:4).  
 
To conclude, policymakers need to become attuned to the popular spaces that 
communities create for themselves. Otherwise existing and emerging structures of 
governance, while exhibiting all of the characteristics of success, can only pay lip service 
to the real interests of local communities. All the while risky community ventures 
remain pipe-dreams. Further, government may well assume an uncontested position as 
the regeneration elite overshadow a space that has to date been a domain for 
challenging the state. 
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